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In December 2003, Judge Emmet Sullivan
of the United States District Court of the District
of Columbia invalidated a rule promulgated only
five days before by the National Park Service
(“NPS”) under the Bush administration.  The
rule allowed snowmobiling in Yellowstone
National Park, after the NPS under the Clinton
administration had determined that snowmobil-
ing in Yellowstone impaired the Park’s resources,
and therefore violated the National Park Service
Organic Act of 1916 (“Organic Act”).  Judge
Sullivan determined that the statutes and regula-
tions directing the NPS had a “conservation man-
date” and opined that the Bush administration
did not offer a reasoned analysis explaining why
the new rule satisfied this mandate.  Judge
Sullivan’s order reinstated the Clinton rule.  Less
than two months later, however, Judge Brimmer of
the Wyoming District Court invalidated the
Clinton rule because it did not adequately consid-
er the effects on local businesses.  Judge Brimmer
directed the NPS to craft snowmobile regulations
to satisfy both economic and environmental con-
cerns.  This Comment analyzes the statutory
framework and interpretations of the Organic
Act’s prohibition on impairment of park resources,
arguing that conservation trumps all competing
concerns.  It also examines the NPS Rules and
District Court orders, concluding that the prohibi-
tion on impairment requires elimination of snow-
mobiling in Yellowstone National Park.
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I.  Introduction
Yellowstone National Park
(“Yellowstone” or the “Park”) represents
the crown jewel of the national park sys-
tem.  Congress established Yellowstone
as the world’s first national park1 in 1872,2
to preserve the area in its natural condi-
tion.3 Today, the National Park Service
(“NPS” or “the Service”) operates
Yellowstone under its mandate “to con-
serve the scenery and the natural and his-
toric objects and the wild life [sic] therein
and to provide for the enjoyment of the
same in such manner and by such means
as will leave [the Park] unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.”4 In
fact, the NPS has stated that “[a]s the
physical remnants of our past, and great
scenic and natural places that continue to
evolve—repositories of outstanding
recreation opportunities—class rooms of
our heritage—and the legacy we leave to
future generations—[the parks] warrant
the highest standard of protection.”5 The
Park founders established Yellowstone to
preserve the area in its pristine condition.
Yellowstone provides sanctuary to
five endangered and threatened species,
including the bald eagle (Haliaeetus leuco-
cephalus), the whooping crane (Grus ameri-
cana),6 the grizzly bear (Ursus arctos horri-
bilis), the gray wolf (Canis lupus),7 and the
Canadian lynx (Felis lynx canadensis).8 Also,
approximately 4,000 bison (Bison bison
Linnaeus)9 and 30,000 elk (Cervus elaphus)10
graze in the Park’s meadows, forests, and
grasslands. This 2.2 million acre11 reserve
offers a protected home to these species
whose habitats elsewhere are rapidly dis-
appearing.12
Yellowstone also contains numerous
geological wonders, including 300 gey-
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1.  National Park Service, U.S. Department of
the Interior, Yellowstone National Park Facts ¶ 1, at
http://www.nps.gov/yell/technical/yellfact.htm (last
updated Dec. 22, 2004) [hereinafter YNP Facts].
2.  National Park Service Organic Act of 1916,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f, 1a-1 (2000 & Supp. II 2003)
[hereinafter Organic Act].
3.  Yellowstone National Park Act of 1872, 16
U.S.C. §§ 21-40c, 21 (2000).  (establishing the pur-
pose of Yellowstone as “preservation, from injury
or spoliation, of all timber mineral deposits, natu-
ral curiosities, or wonders, within the park , and
their retention in their natural condition.”).
4.  Id. § 1.
5.  NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, NPS MANAGEMENT
POLICIES ¶¶ 1.1, 1.2 (2001) [hereinafter NPS
MANAGEMENT POLICIES].
6.  YNP Facts, supra note 1, ¶ 2;  National Park
Service, Threatened & Endangered Species, at
http://www.nps.gov/yell/nature/animals/birds/bird
s.html (last updated Jan. 4, 2005).
7.  YNP Facts, supra note 1, ¶ 2;  National Park
Service, Potential Interactions Between Black Bears,
Grizzly Bears, and Gray Wolves in Yellowstone National
Park, at http://www.nps.gov/yell/nature/animals/
bear/infopaper/info9.html (last updated Oct. 20,
2003).
8.  YNP Facts, supra note 1, ¶ 2; National Park
Service, Lynx, at http://www.nps.gov/yell/nature/
animals/lynx/lynx.html (last updated Oct. 20,
2003).
9.  YNP Facts, supra note 1, ¶ 2; National Park
Service, Bison: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.nps.gov/yell/nature/animals/bison/biso
nqa.html (last updated Jan. 13, 2005).
10.  National Park Service, Elk, at
http://www.nps.gov/yell/nature/animals/elk/elk.ht
ml (last updated Oct. 20, 2003)
11.  YNP Facts, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
12.  See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife, 40 Fed. Reg. 31, 374 (July 28, 1975) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (listing the grizzly bear
as a threatened species because “the range of the
grizzly bear [in the contiguous 48 states], which at
one time was most of the western United States, is
now confined to isolated regions in Montana,
Idaho, and Wyoming”).
13.  YNP Facts, supra note 1, ¶ 4.
Faithful.  The Park is the site of 2,000
annual earthquakes and is home to one of
the world’s largest petrified forests, 290
waterfalls, an active volcano, and over
1,000 documented archeological sites.14
When Congress created the NPS, 44 years
after the creation of Yellowstone, it explic-
itly reserved all of these priceless
resources, and those in other national
parks, “to provide for the enjoyment . . . of
future generations.”15
To this picture of beauty, wildlife, and
ancient culture, add the roar of snowmo-
biles and exhaust pollution that despoil
the lands and wildlife that Yellowstone
was established to protect.  In the winter,
some estimates indicate that a snowmo-
bile’s blare can be heard up to 20 miles
away.16 Bison and elk traveling on
groomed trails frequently flee from snow-
mobilers and their “inappropriate behav-
ior.”17 Snowmobile exhaust creates air
pollution in Yellowstone that often
exceeds Los Angeles, California’s rush
hour traffic.18 Over the 90-day winter sea-
son, snowmobiles produce 77 percent of
the annual hydrocarbon emissions within
the Park.19 High levels of air pollutants,
such as carbon monoxide, particulate
matter, and hydrocarbons—including
benzene, ethyl benzene, toluene, xylenes,
aldehydes, and polycyclic aromatic hydro-
carbons—contribute to a pernicious cor-
nucopia of health hazards:  chest pain,
shortness of breath, coughing, wheezing,
headache, heart attacks, lung cancer, and
exacerbation of asthma and chronic heart
and lung disease, to name a few.20 This
air pollution can also saturate the snow,
causing high levels of ground and surface
water pollution during snowmelt.21
This air pollution not only threatens
the health of Yellowstone’s employees,
visitors, and wildlife but also hinders the
enjoyment of the Park’s resources.
Snowmobiles that gather at Old Faithful
produce large levels of carbon monoxide
and particulate matter, considerably
obstructing the visibility of this geyser.22
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14.  Id.
15.  National Park Service Organic Act of 1916,
16 U.S.C. § 1 (2005).
16.  National Parks Conservation Association,
Snowmobiles:  Why Snowmobiles Don’t Belong in Our
National Parks, at http://www.npca.org/
across_the_nation/visitor_experience/motor-
ized_abuse/snowmobiles.asp (last visited April 11,
2005) [hereinafter NPCA]; see also Greater
Yellowstone Coalition, Yellowstone Park Sound Survey,
at http://www.greateryellowstone.org/news/
news_archives/snowmobiles/snowmobiles_noise_
survey.html (last visited April 11, 2005) (determin-
ing that snowmobiles can be heard up to 15-20
miles away).
17.  Special Regulations, Areas of the National
Park System, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,024, 79,026 (proposed
Dec. 18, 2000) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7)
[hereinafter 2000 Proposed Rule].  The 2000
Proposed Rule outlines the actions taken in the
2001 Snowcoach Rule, infra note 23, in greater
detail, without major changes.
18.  SARAH JANSSEN & TED SCHETTLER, HEALTH
IMPLICATIONS OF SNOWMOBILE USE IN YELLOWSTONE
NATIONAL PARK 13, 15 (2003), available at
http://www.womenandenvironment.org/Health_Im
p_snow.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); see also
Nathan L. Scheg, Preservationists vs. Recreationists in
Our National Parks, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 47, 53 (1998) (“Data accumulated by the
California Air Resources Board shows that the
fumes from 1,000 snowmobiles are equal to the
total nitrous oxide and hydrocarbon output of 1.7
million automobile tailpipes.”).
19. JANSSEN & SCHETTLER, supra note 18, at 8.
20.  Id. at 7, 9. “A large body of scientific
research demonstrates” that air pollution causes
these health hazards discussed above.  Id. at 9.
21.  2000 Proposed Rule, supra note 17, 65 Fed.
Reg. At 79,026, 79,026.
22. JANSSEN & SCHETTLER, supra note 18, at 19.
of the NPS, but winter visitors should not
expect quiet solitude—as the snowmobile
rumble erases the quiet.  Instead, they
should expect air pollution rivaling that of
the most polluted urban airscapes in the
country, elevated levels of pollutants
causing various respiratory ailments,
noise pollution, and smog obfuscating
Old Faithful’s spout, due in substantial
part to snowmobile use.
In an attempt to halt Yellowstone’s
winter pollution, at the midnight hour of
the Clinton administration, the NPS
issued a final rule (the “2001 Snowcoach
Rule”).23 In its 2000 Proposed Rule, which
preceded the 2001 Snowcoach Rule, the
Service determined that snowmobile use
adversely affects the natural soundscapes,
wildlife, air quality, and water quality of
Yellowstone and other parks,  and creates
safety hazards24—therefore, harming “the
integrity of the resources and values of
the parks, and . . . constitut[ing] an
impairment.”25 This impairment finding
was legally significant because the legisla-
tion creating the NPS26 requires agency
action to prevent impairment of the
national parks.27 In compliance with this
mandate, the 2001 Snowcoach Rule
directed the Service to phase out snow-
mobiling in Yellowstone by the 2003-2004
winter season.28
Some two years later, in December
2003, when the 2001 Snowcoach Rule was
designed to take full effect, the Bush
administration attempted to reverse the
rule by issuing a new rule (“2003 Final
Rule”), which allowed continued snowmo-
bile use in Yellowstone.29 The record
accompanying the new rule contained
information analyzing the negative conse-
quences of snowmobiles in the Park simi-
lar to that previously evaluated by the
Clinton administration.30 Thus, the 2003
Final Rule seemed merely to reflect a shift
of the political tides.  Instead of the 2001
Snowcoach Rule’s phase-out, the Bush
rule allowed continued snowmobiling
subject to daily limits of 950 snowmobiles
and required use of the new four-stroke
engine technology31 “to more effectively













Hillary Prugh Volume 11, Number 2
23.  Special Regulations, Areas of the National
Park System, 66 Fed. Reg. 7260 (Jan. 22, 2001) (to
be codified at 35 C.F.R. pt. 7) [hereinafter 2001
Snowcoach Rule].
24.  2000 Proposed Rule, supra note 17, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 79,026-27.
25.  Id. at 79,025.
26.  16 U.S.C. § 1.
27.  NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 5, ¶
1.4.4.  The Management Policies establish that
“[t]he impairment of park resources and values
may not be allowed by the Service unless directly
and specifically provided by legislation or by the
proclamation establishing the park.”  Id.
28 2001 Snowcoach Rule, supra note 23, 66
Fed. Reg. at 7265.
29.  Special Rules, Areas of the National Park
System, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,268 (Dec. 11, 2003) (to be cod-
ified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7) [hereinafter 2003 Final Rule].
30.  See NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, WINTER USE PLANS,
FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT,
VOL. 2 at 26 (2003) (stating that the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) commented on the Draft
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
(“Draft SEIS”) discussing the proposed 2003 Final
Rule as follows:  “The new information provided
regarding snowmobile technologies [i.e. the four-
stroke engine] is largely within the range of informa-
tion and alternatives considered in the Final
Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”).”), available
at http://www.nps.gov/grte/winteruse/fseis/vol2/2-
coopagencies.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005) [here-
inafter WINTER USE PLANS FSEIS VOL. 2].
31.  Special Regulations, Areas of the National
Park System, 68 Fed. Reg. 51,526, 51,530 (proposed
Aug. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7)
[hereinafter 2003 Proposed Rule]. The new tech-
nology was the four-stroke engines, which decreased
hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions by 95-
98 percent and 85 percent, respectively.  Id.
use in Yellowstone . . . .”32 The Bush admin-
istration’s view of impairment differed sig-
nificantly from that of the Clinton adminis-
tration and 91 percent of Yellowstone’s
interested parties, whose comments sup-
ported snowmobile elimination.33
This Comment addresses the legal
issues surrounding snowmobiles in
Yellowstone by considering two broad ques-
tions. First, did the NPS satisfy the Supreme
Court’s standard of providing a “reasoned
analysis” 34 when it reversed the 2001
Snowcoach Rule in the absence of new
facts?  Second, under the National Park
Service Organic Act of 1916 (“Organic Act”),35
does snowmobiling result in an impairment
of Park resources, and should it therefore be
prohibited in Yellowstone?  This Comment
concludes that the NPS failed to present a
“reasoned analysis” justifying the drastic
departure from the 2001 Snowcoach Rule,
and that the effects of snowmobiling, if
unabated, will leave Yellowstone impaired
for future generations. 
This Comment contains five sections
discussing the legal framework for the
management of Yellowstone, as well as the
recent litigation over snowmobiling.
Section II explains the Organic Act’s direc-
tive requiring the Service to leave park
resources “unimpaired,” examining the his-
torical context of the drafter’s intent, the
statutory language, the NPS Management
Policies, and judicial interpretation of the
Act.  Section III considers the two compet-
ing rules for snowmobile use in
Yellowstone.  First, it addresses the Clinton
administration’s plan to phase out snow-
mobiling in the Park under the provisions
of the 2001 Snowcoach Rule.  Second, it
discusses the Bush administration’s rever-
sal under the 2003 Final Rule, as well as the
new technology and policies the NPS pre-
sented to justify the change.  Section IV
analyzes the recent litigation surrounding
these two rules, discussing two apparently
conflicting district court orders from the
District of Columbia and Wyoming.
Section V applies the definition of impair-
ment to Yellowstone to assess the appro-
priate role for snowmobiling in the Park.
The Comment concludes that snowmobil-
ing does in fact impair Yellowstone’s
resources, and therefore cannot coexist
with the NPS’s statutory mandate to pre-
vent impairment of national parks.
II.  Impairment of National Parks
The Organic Act created the NPS and
the national park system, assigning the
new agency the duty to ensure that the
parks remain “unimpaired for the enjoy-
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32.  Id. at 51,526.
33.  2003 Final Rule, supra note 29, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 69,269.  (“91% of all commentors believed the pro-
posed regulation does not adequately protect park
resources due to the presence of snowmobiles [and
said that the NPS should] instead allow the [2001
Snowcoach Rule] to take effect, which would elimi-
nate snowmobiles in favor of mass transit snow-
coaches.”).   See also News Release, Greater
Yellowstone Coalition, Taxpayers Will Pay $1.3
Million More Each Year to Subsidize Snowmobile
Use in Yellowstone and Grand Teton (Mar. 25, 2003),
at http://www.greateryellowstone.org/news/news_
archives/snowmobiles/snowmobiles_final_ROD_nr.h
tml (last visited Apr. 20, 2005) (NPS received 360,000
comments for the SEIS, of which 80 percent urged
the agency to phase out snowmobiles.) [hereinafter
Taxpayers Will Pay].  Note that there is a difference in
the percentages of comments supporting snowmo-
bile phase-out because the ‘91 percent’ statistic
reflects comments on the FSEIS, whereas the ‘80 per-
cent’ statistic reflects comments on the Draft SEIS.
34.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
35.  16 U.S.C. § 1 to 18f-3.
36.  Id. § 1.
tive, NPS’s chief responsibility, instructs
the Service to ensure the integrity of a
park’s resources and values.37
Unfortunately, the Organic Act did not
define the key term, “unimpaired.”  This
section examines the meaning of “unim-
paired” by analyzing the historical context
of the Organic Act, statutory framework,
the NPS Management Policies imple-
menting the Act, and judicial interpreta-
tions of the statute.
A.  Historical Context and Contemporary
Thought
The Organic Act’s primary promoters
were passionate about national park
preservation and the need for the NPS.
Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr.38 composed
the Organic Act’s introduction, climaxing
with the statement that the parks must
remain “unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations.”39 Together with
California Representative William Kent,
the founding father of the Organic Act,
Olmsted crafted the Act’s mission state-
ment intending to apply a “common sense
approach to the questions of impair-
ment.”40 Olmsted believed the impair-
ment determination should focus on the
probability of adverse influences to the
parks.41 Olmsted offered five criteria for
impairment determinations:  1) those who
advocate a proposed activity have the bur-
den to demonstrate that the activity is
“within the theoretical limits of jurisdic-
tion of a National Park”;42 2) the activity
must be of “real social importance from a
national standpoint”43 to be permitted
inside park boundaries; 3) the activity
cannot “endanger the value of the park for
its proper purpose to the slightest appre-
ciable degree”;44 4) the activity must be
suitable for the park; and 5) the impor-
tance of the activity causing the impair-
ment must be of greater value than the
park’s purposes to justify the
impairment.45 In sum, according to
Olmsted, the Organic Act’s inclusion of
the term “unimpaired” requires that advo-
cates of a proposed activity demonstrate a
compelling need in order to trump this
high preservation standard. 
Representative William Kent, the
“father of the National Park System,”46
also sought to create a high protection
criterion for the national parks, emphasiz-
ing that the NPS must resist surrounding
communities’ pressures to transform the
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37. See NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 5,
¶¶ 1.4.4, 1.4.5.
38.  Olmsted, Jr. was the son of Frederick Law
Olmsted, creator of New York City’s Central Park
and early promoter of Yosemite National Park.
Olmsted, Jr. also emerged as a designer and pro-
moter of the national parks.  Robin W. Winks, The
National Park Service Act of 1916:  “A Contradictory
Mandate”?, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 575, 596 (1997).  This
article concludes that the Organic Act does not
have a contradictory mandate because after analyz-
ing the legislative history it is clear that Congress’s
intent was resource conservation.  Id. at 623.
39.  Id. at 596; 16 U.S.C. § 1.  
40.  Winks, supra note 38, at 596, 598 (quoting
Olmsted’s commentary on “impairment”).
41.  Id. at 598-99. “[W]ithin the theoretical lim-
its of jurisdiction of a National Park” seems to refer
to activities that one could reasonably imagine
taking place within park boundaries.
42.  Id. at 599.
43. Id.
44.  Id. 
45.  Id.  The NPS management policies also
reflect this perspective on impairment determina-
tions.  NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 5, ¶¶
1.4.4, 1.4.5.
46.  Winks, supra note 38, at 599.
47.  Id. at 602. It is also important to note that
Kent was Vice President of the Playground and













Kent believed that conservation of the
national park’s scenery was the “most
valuable purpose.”48 He distinguished
national forests and monuments from
parks, asserting that the national parks
“must be held in a state of nature and that
animal life must be forever free from
molestation.”49 Kent also agreed with
Henry S. Graves, Chief Forester in 1916,
who declared that the goal of the national
parks was to “preserve these areas in their
natural condition,” by conservation of the
parks’ “exceptional natural wonders.”50
These statements make clear that the cre-
ators of the Organic Act drafted the
“unimpaired” clause to ensure exception-
al husbandry of the lands and wildlife
within the national parks.
B.  Statutory Framework
The Organic Act directs the NPS to
“conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and wild life [sic] [in the
parks] and to provide for the enjoyment of
the same in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for
the enjoyment of future generations.”51
This directive creates two obligations for
the NPS in Yellowstone.  First, the Service
must protect Yellowstone’s resources,
such as Old Faithful, the roaming bison
and elk, and the Park’s spectacular
scenery.52 Second, the Service must “pro-
vide for the enjoyment” of the Park’s
resources in a manner and through such
means as will preserve the resources for
“future generations.”53 The purpose fails
to mention any balancing between con-
servation and recreation;  Congress limit-
ed recreation to a manner ensuring
resource protection.  This directive estab-
lishes preservation of natural resources
within the parks as the Service’s primary
focus, not to be displaced by visitor enjoy-
ment.  
Under the Yellowstone National Park
Act of 1872 (“Yellowstone Act”),54 the NPS
must provide for the “preservation, from
injury or spoliation, of all timber, mineral
deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders,
within the park, and their retention in
their natural condition.”55 Like the
Organic Act, the 1872 Act also emphasized
a conservation theme by reiterating the
importance of preserving the natural
resources within Yellowstone’s bound-
aries56 and stating that the Park’s
resources should be maintained “in their
natural condition.”57 In addition to the
statues, President Nixon’s 1972 and
President Carter’s 1977 Executive
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Act was drafted.  Thus, if he had intended the
national parks to focus on recreation he would
have explicitly stated that intent in the Organic
Act.  Id. However, Kent and the other creators of
the Organic Act chose instead to emphasize park
preservation.  Id.
48.  Id. at 601.  See also Holly Doremus, Nature,
Knowledge and Profit: The Yellowstone Bioprospecting
Controversy and the Core Purposes of America’s National
Parks, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 438–39 (1999) (“Most
observers have concluded that these areas were
designated for preservation primarily on account
of their spectacular natural scenery.”).
49.  Winks, supra note 38, at 601 (internal quo-
tations omitted).
50.  Id. at 602.
51.  Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1.
52.  Id.  (“purpose is to conserve the scenery
and the natural and historic objects and the wild
life therein . . .”).
53.  Id.  (“purpose is . . . to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations”).
54.  16 U.S.C. §§ 21–40c.















Orders58 prescribe NPS administration of
snowmobile use in the national parks
eliminating its use when adverse to the
natural resources.59 The plain language
of the statutes and Executive Orders
require protection of Yellowstone’s
resources allowing recreational activities,
such as snowmobiling, only when the
resources are not threatened. 
C.  The National Park Service
Interpretation of Impairment
The NPS’s generic snowmobile regula-
tion also allows snowmobile use only
when “consistent with the park’s natural,
cultural, scenic and aesthetic values . . . .”60
The NPS Management Policies further
reflect the Organic Act’s predominant con-
servation theme by declaring that nation-
al parks “warrant the highest standard of
protection.”61 These management poli-
cies require the NPS, first and foremost,
to preserve park resources, according pro-
tection a higher priority than enjoyment
by citizens, including both visitors and
non-visitors who enjoy from afar.62 The
management policies establish resource
preservation as the NPS’s primary duty.63 
To fulfill this directive, the NPS
Management Policies mirror the Organic
Act by prohibiting impairment to park
resources.64 The policies define impair-
ments as “impacts that . . . would harm
the integrity of the park resources or val-
ues . . . .”65 According to the NPS, adverse
effects caused by actions unnecessary for
park purposes, integrity, or goals are more
likely to impair than effects that are the
“unavoidable result . . . of an action nec-
essary to preserve or restore the integrity
of park resources or values.”66 As evi-
denced by the regulation and these poli-
cies, the NPS has determined that an
impairment exists when an action threat-
ens park resources, unless the action
itself is necessary to protect the park.67
D.  Judicial Interpretations of
Impairment
Court interpretations of the Organic
Act and its amendments state that
resource protection is the “overarching
concern” of the NPS.68 In 1996, the Ninth
Circuit declared that the NPS had no
choice but to manage park recreation in
light of the statutory mandate of resource
Hillary Prugh Volume 11, Number 2
58.  Exec. Order No. 11,644, 37 Fed. Reg. 2877
(Feb. 8, 1972), as amended by Exec. Order No.
11,989, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,959 (May 24, 1977), reprint-
ed in note following 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1977).
Executive Order 11,989 requires agency heads to
“immediately close . . . areas or trails” where off-
road vehicle use “will cause or is causing consider-
able adverse effects on the soil, vegetation,
wildlife, wildlife habitat or cultural or historic
resources of particular areas or trails of the public
lands . . .” until the adverse effects have been elim-
inated or mearsures implemented to prevent
recurrence.  Id.
59. See Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp.
2d 92, 102 (D.D.C. 2003).
60.  36 C.F.R. § 2.18(c) (2004).
61.  NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 6, ¶ 1.2.
62.  Id. ¶ 1.4.3.
63.  Id.
64.  Id. ¶ 1.4.4.
65.  Id. ¶ 1.4.5.
66.  Id.
67.  Id.
68.  Bicycle Trails Council of Marin v. Babbitt, 82
F.3d 1445, 1453 (9th Cir. 1996).  The court also stat-
ed that “[i]ntervenors argue persuasively that . . .
Congress clearly intended by its 1970 and 1978
amendments to the Organic Act that NPS . . . man-
age all areas of the park system uniformly with the














protection.69 The court’s ruling reflected
the Organic Act’s intent that land and
wildlife preservation take priority over
recreation in the national parks.
A decade earlier, the District Court for
the District of Columbia also came to a
similar conclusion.  While the court’s
statements were made while assessing
whether it was rational for the NPS to
reach the conclusion that conservation
was it primary management function, it
stated in categorical terms that “[i]n the
Organic Act Congress speaks of but a sin-
gle purpose, namely, conservation . . . .”70
The court also determined that from the
beginning the NPS’s “paramount objec-
tive” was protectionism.71 Therefore, the
court ruled that the NPS regulations pro-
hibiting hunting and trapping in the
national park system, except where
Congress explicitly allowed,72 were con-
sistent with the Organic Act’s purpose,
“that being of course, . . . conservation of
wildlife resources.”73
The Sixth Circuit also adopted the
District of Columbia District Court’s find-
ings, concluding that “unlike national
forests, Congress did not regard the
National Park System to be compatible
with consumptive uses.  Rather, Congress
intended the Park Service to manage the
system in order ‘to conserve the scenery
and the national and historic objects and
the wild life therein’ . . . .”74 The Tenth
Circuit has also concluded that “signifi-
cant, permanent impairment would vio-
late the Act’s mandate that the NPS pro-
vide for the enjoyment of the parks in
such manner and by such means as will
leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations.”75 In addition to
preventing permanent impairment, the
court determined that Congress intended
to prohibit other temporary impacts
adverse to the natural resources.76 The
Tenth Circuit did not elaborate as to what
temporary impacts would be adverse to
the natural resources, but in the instruc-
tions for remand, the court hinted that
impact of off-road vehicles on a ten-mile
segment near Salt Creek, the “only year-
round, fresh water creek in Canyonlands
National Park other than the Colorado
and Green Rivers,” would meet “the level
of impairment prohibited by the Act.”77
To ascertain whether the proposed activi-
ty would leave the national park resources
“unimpaired,” the court ruled that the
NPS must balance the competing values
of preservation and public enjoyment to
determine the level of temporary impair-
ment prohibited by the Organic Act.78 It
is also important to note that this deci-
sion was issued before the NPS
Management Polices, which stress
resource protection,79 but the court deter-
mined that the policies would likely
69.  Id.
70.  Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Potter, 628 F. Supp.
903, 909 (D.D.C. 1986). See also Fund for Animals, 294
F. Supp. 2d at 105.
71.  Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 905 (“The paramount
objective of the park system with respect to its
indigenous wildlife, and the philosophy which
came to pervade the new Park Service to whom it
was entrusted, was, from the beginning, one of
protectionism.”).
72.  36 C.F.R § 2.2 (2005).
73.  Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 910, 912. 
74.  Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949
F.2d 202, 207 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1). 
75. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d
819, 829 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1).
76.  Id.
77.  Id. at 822, 829. 
78.  Id. at 826.
79. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying
text (discussing NPS Management Policies).













deserve agency deference.80 Congress
thus entrusted the NPS with the primary
management duty of preserving the natu-
ral resources of the park system for future
generations, even at the risk of compro-
mising recreation.81
III.  The Rules
In 1963, after 91 years of quiet win-
ters, the NPS allowed the first snowmo-
biles into Yellowstone.82 NPS imple-
mented the first winter-use policy in 1968
and began grooming trails in 1971.83
Winter use, including snowmobiling, of
Yellowstone, Grand Teton National Park,
and the John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Memorial
Parkway increased dramatically over the
next three decades, and winter visitors in
the combined parks doubled within a
decade from 70,000 in 1983 to 140,000 in
1993.84 To accommodate this increase in
winter visitors—up to 1,700 snowmobiles
on peak days during the 2001-2001 winter
season85—NPS groomed 180 miles of
trail at least every other night.86
Yellowstone’s snowmobile litigation
began in 1997, following the 1996-1997
winter season when the Service killed over
1,000 bison leaving the Park on groomed
trails to prevent the spread of brucel-
losis.87 The bison kill sparked concern
over the conduit of the bison exodus—the
groomed trails.88 The Fund for Animals
(the “Fund”)89 challenged NPS’s reliance
on the winter plan in effect in 1997, alleg-
ing that NPS violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)90 by
failing to prepare an environmental
80.  Dabney, 22 F.3d at 829. 
81.  Potter, 628 F. Supp. at  912.  “The Secretary
and the Park Service have been charged by
Congress with the responsibility for achieving the
sometimes conflicting goals of preserving the
country’s natural resources for future generations
while ensuring their enjoyment by current uses. . .
[The Service reasonably interpreted that its] pri-
mary management function with respect to Park
wildlife is its preservation. . . .” Id.
82. Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
83.  Id.
84.  Id.
85.  2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 31, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 51,528; Press Release, National Park
Service, Winter Use Decision for Yellowstone and
Grand Teton National Park is Announced (Nov. 22,
2000), available at www.yellowstone-park.net/win-
teruse.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005) [hereinafter
NPS Press Release].
86. See Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
87.  Id. at 99; Intertribal Bison Co-op v. Babbitt, 25
F. Supp.2d 1135, 1137 (provides a history of the
Service’s policy dealing with bison leaving
Yellowstone and the State of Montana’s involve-
ment).  Brucellosis is a contagious livestock dis-
ease, which in 1917 was discovered in
Yellowstone’s bison in 1917.  Robert B. Keiter,
Preserving Nature in the National Parks:  Law, Policy, and
Science in a Dynamic Environment, 74 DENV. U. L. REV.
649, 661 (1997).  Bison can pass the disease to cat-
tle, which can then cause cattle to abort.  Id.
Although “science has not definitively answered
whether brucellosis can be transmitted from
wildlife to cattle in the wild[, t]here is no con-
firmed instance where free roaming wildlife have
infected domestic livestock with brucellosis on the
open range.”  Robert B. Keiter & Peter H.
Froelicher, Bison, Brucellosis, and Law in the Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem, 28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 28
(1993).  Also, one respected scientist in the field
concluded that bison are not a threat to transmit-
ting brucellosis to cattle.  Id. at 28-29.  For further
discussion about the science behind brucellosis
transmission between bison, elk, and cattle, see id.
at 27-32.
88.  Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
89.  The Fund for Animals (the “Fund”)  is a
non-profit organization “committed to preserving
animal and plant species in their natural habitats
and to preventing the abuse and exploitation of
both wild and domestic animals.”  Fund for Animals,
294 F. Supp. 2d at 97 (internal quotations omitted).
90.  National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000) (“NEPA”).













impact statement (“EIS”) discussing snow-
mobiling and trail grooming.  The Fund also
alleged that the NPS violated the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”)91
by failing to consult with the Fish and
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) to determine the
impact of snowmobiling and trail grooming
on the federally protected species, specifi-
cally the grizzly bear and gray wolf.92 The
Fund and NPS subsequently reached a set-
tlement agreement requiring, among other
things, that the Service prepare an EIS and
Biological Assessment and then engage in
a “formal consultation”93 with the FWS.94
The process ultimately resulted in a com-
prehensive environmental impact state-
ment (“FEIS”), which paved the way for the
adoption of the Clinton administration’s
2001 Snowcoach Rule95 and the gradual
phase-out of snowmobile use.96 But the
2001 Snowcoach Rule never took effect
because it was published the day after
President Bush took office, and the Bush
administration immediately stayed its
implementation.97
In the meantime, the International
Snowmobile Manufacturers Association
(“ISMA”) challenged the 2001 Snowcoach
Rule, alleging that it inadequately consid-
ered the new snowmobile technologies.98
This second suit resulted in yet another
settlement, requiring NPS to create a sup-
plemental environmental impact state-
ment (“SEIS”).99 The new SEIS, prepared
by the Bush administration, included
information about the new snowmobile
technologies, socioeconomic concerns,
employee health concerns, and the
alleged reduced adverse effects of the
“new” four-stroke snowmobile engines.100
During the SEIS comment period, the NPS
received over 350,000 comments, over 80
percent of which favored retaining the
2001 Snowcoach Rule, rather than allow-
ing continued snowmobiling.101 Despite
this widespread support for implementa-
tion of the 2001 Snowcoach Rule, the NPS
promulgated the 2003 Final Rule that
allowed 950 snowmobiles per day, imple-
mented an “adaptive management” strate-
gy, and required use of the “best available
technology”—the four stroke engine.102
This section analyzes the process and
rationale behind these competing rules,
beginning with the Clinton administra-
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91.  Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (2000) (“ESA”).
92. Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
However, the formal consultation never occurred
because the FWS concurred with NPS that contin-
ued trail grooming was unlikely to affect protected
species.  Id. at 100.
93.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (“Each federal
agency shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency
… is not likely to jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of any endangered species….”).
94. Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 99. The
Fish and Wildlife Service “‘concurred’ in the con-
clusions that the proposed action was not likely to
adversely affect protected species,” thus the for-
mal consultation did not occur.  Id. at 100.
95.  NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, WINTER USE PLANS,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2000) [here-
inafter FEIS]. See also Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp.
2d at  99-100 (discussing Yellowstone’s snowmo-
biling factual background).
96.  Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 99-100.
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. at 100-01.
100.  Id. at 101 (internal quotations omitted).
See infra notes 134-153 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the “significant new or additional informa-
tion or data” analyzed by the NPS in the SEIS dur-
ing the Bush administration).
101. Fund for Animals, 294 F.Supp.2d at 101.
102.  Id.  See generally infra notes 115-157 and














tion’s snowmobiling ban, followed by the
Bush administration’s reversal.
A.  The Clinton Administration’s Ban on
Snowmobiling
In May 1997, the Fund sued the NPS
to compel preparation of the FEIS, even-
tually settling in 2000; pursuant to this
settlement, NPS prepared an FEIS in
cooperation with nine other agencies.103
The FEIS process included six public
meetings, 46,500 public comments, a
rulemaking petition, and a two-day “snow-
mobile summit.”104 In the end, in the
2001 Snowcoach Rule, the NPS deter-
mined that snowmobiling created an
impairment because of the adverse effects
on natural soundscapes, wildlife, air qual-
ity, water quality, visitors, and safety con-
siderations.105 Therefore, the rule aimed
to eliminate snowmobiling from
Yellowstone.106
The essence of Yellowstone’s visitor
attraction is the opportunity to encounter
the Park’s wildlife, natural wonders, and
the accompanying soundscapes.107
Unfortunately, NPS determined that
Yellowstone’s winter soundscapes includ-
ed constant snowmobile blare at popular
venues; for instance, visitors heard snow-
mobiles at Old Faithful 95 percent of the
time and 87 percent of the time at the
Grand Canyon of Yellowstone.108 The
NPS relied on four separate studies indi-
cating that one snowmobile was audible
4,120 feet away, much further than auto-
mobiles, which can only be heard from
approximately half the distance.109
The NPS also found that snowmo-
biles significantly affected the wildlife that
seek refuge in Yellowstone.  It reviewed
232 publications on the impacts of recre-
ation on wildlife, concluding that snow-
mobilers caused severe impacts and
aggravation to Yellowstone’s wildlife
because of their large number and inap-
propriate behavior that harassed the ani-
mals.110 Ungulates,111 such as bison and
elk, gravitate to groomed trails for easier
travel, leading to interactions with snow-
mobile traffic.112 One study concluded
that snowmobile presence negatively
affected the 60 percent of bison that trav-
el on groomed trails, as evidenced by
observations of bison fleeing from snow-
mobiles.113 Therefore, the NPS deter-
mined that, along with the normal winter
stresses on wildlife due to deep snow,
Hillary Prugh Volume 11, Number 2
103.  2000 Proposed Rule, supra note 17, 65
Fed. Reg. at 79,024.
104.  Id.
105.  Id. at 79,025-27.  “This prohibition on
impairment is the single most important statutory
direction Congress has provided for the manage-
ment of the national park.”  Id. at 79,025.
106.  Id.
107.  Id. at 79,026-27.  “Soundscapes” are “the
sounds which form an auditory environment.”
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1989). 
108.  2000 Proposed Rule, supra note 17, 65
Fed. Reg. at 79,026.
109.  Id.  Automobiles can only be heard from
approximately 2,330 feet away.  Id.
110.  Id. The 2001 Snowcoach Rule did not
describe the “inappropriate behavior,” but snow-
mobilers have been described as “a little bit
obnoxious,” creating a “birdwatchers against the
NASCAR crowd” war, with snowmobilers “hot-dog-
ging” bison herds, [and] “rocket[ing] along at
speeds of 60 or 70 mph . . . .” William Booth, At
Yellowstone, the Din of Snowmobiles and Debate, WASH.
POST, Feb. 6, 2003 at A3.
111.  Ungulates are mammals with hoofs, such
as bison and elk.  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2497 (1971).
112.  2000 Proposed Rule, supra note 17, 65
Fed. Reg. at 79,026.
113.  Id. But see Daniel Fortin & Mark
Andruskiw, Behavioral Response of Free-Ranging Bison to
Human Disturbance, 31 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULLETIN 804,













extreme cold, and food shortages, snow-
mobiling was an unacceptable incremental
strain.114
The Service also relied on multiple
studies documenting Yellowstone’s air
quality deterioration.115 According to the
NPS, even though snowmobiles are only
in the Park during three months of the
year and compose only a small fraction of
the motorized vehicle use in Yellowstone,
snowmobiles contributed more air pollu-
tion than automobiles annually.116
Snowmobiles accounted for up to 90 per-
cent of the annual hydrocarbons and 35 to
68 percent of the annual carbon monoxide
pollution in the Park.117 In the 1993-1994
winter season, excessive levels of carbon
monoxide contributed to 1,200 letters
complaining of adverse effects on employ-
ee and visitor health.118 The
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
commented that Yellowstone possibly
exceeded the allowable increase in partic-
ulate matter under the Clean Air Act’s
“Prevention of Significant Deterioration”
program.119 Furthermore, snowmobiles
contributed to decreased visibility at the
West Entrance, at Old Faithful, and on
other heavily used roadways.120 In addi-
tion, during snowmelt, this air pollution
contributed to ground and surface water
pollution.121 Finally, according to the
NPS, concentrations of ammonium, sul-
fate, benzene, and toluene in areas corre-
lating with snow traffic were greater than
the 50 to 60 other sites sampled in the
Rocky Mountain region.122
The NPS also determined that snow-
mobile pollution decreased visitor enjoy-
ment, while exacerbating numerous safety
concerns.  Winter surveys indicated that
the most important visitor enjoyment fac-
tors were the opportunity to view scenery
and wildlife, the safe behavior of others,
and the ability to experience clean air and
solitude.123 As discussed above, snow-
mobiles harassed wildlife and adversely
affected scenic views and clean air.124 In
addition, snowmobiles aggravated safety
hazards.  For example, in 1994, 44 percent
of all fatalities occurring in Yellowstone
resulted from snowmobiling.125 Further,
in 1998, when snowmobilers accounted
for only two percent of all Park visitors,
they were involved in nine percent of the
vehicular accidents.126 This dispropor-
tionate quantity of fatalities and acci-
dents, together with the deteriorating
wildlife habitat and air quality, convinced
the NPS under the Clinton administration
to ban snowmobiling in Yellowstone.127
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Albert National Park in central Saskatchewan,
Canada, which determined that “[i]n winter bison
were as likely to flee from an observer traveling by
snowmobile as from one on foot”).
114.  2000 Proposed Rule, supra note 17, 65





119.  Id.  See generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7618, 7470-7479 (2000) (the Clean Air Act’s
Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program).  
120.  2000 Proposed Rule, supra note 17, 65
Fed. Reg. at 79,026.
121.  Id. 
122.  Id.  These concentrations were greatest
on the roadway between West Yellowstone and
Old Faithful.  Id.
123.  Id. at 79,026-27.
124.  See supra notes 107-22 and accompanying
text (discussing snowmobiles’ negative effects on
wildlife, scenery, and clean air).
125.  2000 Proposed Rule, supra note 17, 65
Fed. Reg. at 79,027.
126.  Id.













After determining that snowmobiles
impaired Yellowstone’s resources, the
Clinton administration issued the 2001
Snowcoach Rule eliminating snowmobiles
from the Park. 128 The 2001 Snowcoach
Rule authorized a gradual snowmobile
phase-out from Yellowstone, which would
culminate with a total prohibition of snow-
mobiling by the 2003-2004 winter sea-
son.129 Snowcoaches, carrying eight pas-
sengers each, would replace snowmobiles,
which carry only one driver and one pas-
senger.130 According to the NPS, “the
snowmobile use occurring in [Yellowstone]
harms the integrity of the resources and
values of the [Park], and therefore consti-
tutes an impairment.”131 Thus, relying on
the overwhelming evidence that snowmo-
biling degraded Yellowstone’s environ-
ment, the Service planned to eliminate
snowmobiling from the Park by the 2003-
2004 winter season.132
B.  The Bush Administration’s Reversal
In December 2003, the NPS, under
the Bush administration, reversed the
2001 Snowcoach Rule, allowing snowmo-
biles in Yellowstone despite the agency’s
earlier finding that snowmobiling consti-
tuted an impairment to Park resources.133
Before rescinding the rule, the NPS pre-
pared an SEIS, addressing issues it
claimed the 2000 FEIS overlooked.134
According to the 2003 Record of Decision
(“2003 ROD”) announcing the new rule,
“[t]he laws give the NPS the discretion to
allow some impacts to park resources and
values when appropriate and necessary to
fulfill the purposes of a park as long as
that impact does not constitute impair-
ment.”135 The 2003 ROD acknowledged,
however, that the environmental analysis
presented by the Bush administration was
not “vastly different” from the 2001
Snowcoach Rule analysis.136 The NPS’s
new decision considered the same issues
as in the original rule, such as air and
noise pollution and adverse effects on
wildlife, but it added to the mix socioeco-
nomics, solutions to the employee health
concerns, and the reduced adverse effects
that a “new”137 snowmobile technology
Hillary Prugh Volume 11, Number 2
128.  2001 Snowcoach Rule, supra note 23, 66
Fed. Reg. at 7260; 2000 Proposed Rule, supra note
17, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,025.
129.  Id. at 79,024.
130.  Id. at 79,027.
131.  Id. at 79,025.
132.  See id. at 79,026 (discussing the multiple
adverse environmental impacts to Yellowstone’s
resources such as natural soundscapes, wildlife,
air quality, and water quality).  
133.  2003 Final Rule, supra note 29, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 69,268.
134.  NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, WINTER USE PLANS,
FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, VOL. 1, SUMMARY OF THE SEIS at S-1
(2003), available at http://www.nps.gove/grte/win-
teruse/fseis/vol1/2-summary.pdf (last visited Feb.
10, 2005) [hereinafter SEIS SUMMARY].  
135.  NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, RECORD OF
DECISION, WINTER USE PLANS-SUPPLEMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR YELLOWSTONE
AND GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARKS AND THE JOHN D.
ROCKEFELLER JR., MEMORIAL PARKWAY 18 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.nps.gov/grte/winteruse/
FinalROD.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2005) [here-
inafter 2003 ROD].
136.  Id. at 6 n.2.
137.  For purposes of discussion, this article
refers to four-stroke engine snowmobile technolo-
gy as “new.”  However, the designation of this tech-
nology as “new” is misleading.  Although, the 2003
Final Rule called the technology “new,” the 2001
Snowcoach Rule, in fact, evaluated the availability
of “[c]leaner, quieter snowmobiles” but concluded
that they “would do little, if anything, to reduce the
most serious impacts on wildlife, which are caused
more by snowmobiles . . . .”  2001 Snowcoach Rule,
supra note 23, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7260. See also Fund for
Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92, 106 (D.D.C. 2003)













would have on Yellowstone’s delicate win-
ter environment in justifying the rever-
sal.138 This section examines the NPS’s
new findings and the resulting 2003 Final
Rule to discuss the NPS’s paradigm shift
under the Bush administration, which
effectively redefined “impairment.”  
The snowmobile industry’s alleged
new technology, four-stroke engines, con-
stituted the major change in assessing
effects of snowmobiling in Yellowstone.139
According to the 2003 Final Rule, the new
four-stroke engines reduced carbon
monoxide and hydrocarbon air pollution
by 85 percent and 95-98 percent, respec-
tively, “relative to the EPA’s baseline
assumptions about current average two-
stroke snowmobile emissions.”140
Moreover, in response to an Occupational
Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”)141 study in February 2000, which
discovered that employees riding snow-
mobiles during work were exposed to
excessive levels of noise, carbon monox-
ide, benzene, and formaldehyde, and
severe vibration, the 2003 Final Rule stat-
ed that the NPS would provide earplugs
and other protective equipment at
employees’ request.142 To further improve
employee work conditions, the 2003 Final
Rule planned to redesign the kiosks at the
Park’s West Entrance to minimize noise
and air pollution.143
The 2003 Final Rule also represented
the NPS’s new perspective that although
some winter visitors wanted tranquil,
peaceful, solitary Yellowstone visits, these
desires were those of a minority of the
winter users because 75 percent of winter
park visitors rode snowmobiles.144 The
NPS concluded that “there [was no] evi-
dence that winter recreation [was] clearly
responsible for any long-term adverse
consequences to ungulate populations,
including bison and elk” because “both of
these species [were] at sound populations
levels.”145 Consequently, the NPS deter-
mined that snowmobiling did not consti-
tute an impairment because the agency
considered the new snowmobile technol-
ogy and protective equipment for employ-
ees sufficient to mitigate any adverse
impacts.146 More importantly, as dis-
cussed above, the NPS reversed its earlier
impairment finding by determining that,
contrary to its conclusion three years ear-
lier, visitors and wildlife were not actually
adversely affected by snowmobiles.147
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(same).  Moreover, the District of Columbia
District Court noted that the 2003 Final Rule
acknowledged that snowmobile emissions even
increased between the 2002 and 2004 model years.
Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 107 n.9. 
138.  2003 ROD, supra note 135, at 6-7.
139.  2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 31, 68
Fed. Reg. at 51,527.
140.  Id.
141.  The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”), part of the U.S.
Department of Labor, is the agency charged by the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. 651–678 (2000), with the duty to save lives,
prevent injuries, and protect the health of
American workers.  For more information, see
http://www.osha.gov/oshinfo/mission.html (last
visited Feb. 13, 2005).
142.  2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 31, 68
Fed. Reg. at 51,528.
143.  Id. Kiosks are “a stand or booth at which
merchandise is sold or information is provided.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1245
(1971). 
144.  2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 31, 68
Fed. Reg. at 51,528.
145.  Id. 
146.  Id.
147.  Id. See supra notes 144-45 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Bush administration’s
findings that the majority of visitors rode snow-
mobiles and that bison and elk populations were













The 2003 Final Rule also adopted
what it called an “adaptive management
and monitoring strategy.”148 This strategy
allowed Yellowstone’s managers to use
their discretion to modify the daily snow-
mobile limits and restrictions when
wildlife, air quality, noise quality, employ-
ee and visitor health and safety, or visitor
enjoyment thresholds were exceeded.149
Additionally, the 2003 Final Rule required
that all snowmobiles in Yellowstone use
the “best available technology”— the
four-stroke engine—by the 2004-2005
winter season to reduce Yellowstone’s air
and noise pollution.150 The rule further
required all snowmobiles to travel in
groups composed of between one and
eleven snowmobiles, including a
guide.151 Finding that snowmobilers rid-
ing in groups resembled mass transit, the
Service required snowmobilers to main-
tain a one-third of one mile maximum dis-
tance between the first rider and the last
to guarantee exchange of the interpretive
signals through the group to ensure safe-
ty.152 Eighty percent of the groups would
have a commercial guide, while the
remaining 20 percent would have a NPS-
approved leader.153 The NPS also estab-
lished daily entry limits, further mitigating
negative impacts, while maintaining his-
toric visitation levels with the additional
use of snowcoaches.154 The rule allowed
only 950 snowmobiles per day through
Park entrances,155 which according to the
Service, was a reduction compared to the
2001-2002 peak allowance of 1700 snow-
mobiles per day.156 In sum, the NPS
determined that these new limitations on
snowmobile use allowed the Service to
alter snowmobile daily limits and restric-
tions balancing recreation with preserva-
tion, while eliminating impairment.157
IV.  The Litigation
In December 2003, Judge Emmet
Sullivan of the District of Columbia
District Court, invalidated the Bush
administration’s 2003 Final Rule only five
Hillary Prugh Volume 11, Number 2
148.  Id.
149.  Id. at 51,528-29.
150.  Id. at 51,530. 
151.  2003 Final Rule, supra note 29, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 69,274. Note that the rule originally pro-
posed in 2003 required groups composed of
between two and eleven snowmobiles, but the
2003 Final Rule reduced the allowable group size
to between one and eleven snowmobiles because
public comments supported the change and rec-
ognized the NPS’s ability to concentrate snowmo-
biles by other means. Id.  The NPS determined that
snowmobiles generally would be concentrated in
groups because 80 percent will travel with a com-
mercial guide and a survey indicated that only two
percent will ride solo.  Id.  However, it is not entire-
ly clear how groups of one could include the
required guide.  A possible rationale was the NPS’s
assumption that only two percent of visitors ride
solo, and therefore will account for a portion of the
20 percent of the daily entries without a guide.  Id.
152.  2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 31, 68
Fed. Reg. at 51,532-33. See also infra note 215-16 and
accompanying text (discussing Judge Emmet
Sullivan’s analysis of the flaws in this mitigation
effort).
153.  Id.
154.  2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 31, 68
Fed. Reg. at 51,533.
155.  Id.
156.  Id.; NPS Press Release, supra note 85, at 5
(allowing 1690 snowmobiles on Yellowstone’s
peak days).
157.  2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 31, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 51,528-29 (“The NPS is proposing an adap-
tive management and monitoring strategy to miti-
gate the impacts described previously on air quali-
ty, employee and visitor health and safety, natural
soundscapes, wildlife, and visitor experience, while
allowing snowmobile access on all major routes in
Yellowstone . . . .  The NPS will continuously adapt
these limits to protect park resources and values
while allowing for the enjoyment of those resources













days after the rule took effect.158 Less
than two months later, Judge Clarence
Brimmer of the Wyoming District Court
issued an additional order invalidating
the Clinton administration’s 2001
Snowcoach Rule.159 While these opinions
allude to the Organic Act’s impairment
requirement, neither attempts to define
this fundamental term.  This section dis-
cusses both opinions to understand the
courts’ legal reasoning and to assess the
future of snowmobiling in Yellowstone.
A.  The District of Columbia District
Court’s Order 
On March 25, 2003, NPS issued the
2003 ROD reversing the 2001 Snowcoach
Rule, allowing up to 950 snowmobiles per
day in Yellowstone.160 The same day, the
NPS’s drastic rule shift prompted the
Fund and the Greater Yellowstone
Coalition (“GYC”)161 to challenge the rule
in the District of Columbia’s District
Court.162 The two environmental organi-
zations filed separate suits on separate
grounds, but Judge Sullivan consolidated
the suits because they had sufficiently
similar interests.163 The Fund challenge
sought to end trail grooming in the park,
while the GYC sought implementation of
the 2001 Snowcoach Rule, which allowed
trail grooming.164 Thus, the two plaintiffs
desired competing ends.165 The Fund
alleged that the NPS failed to consider
any trail grooming closure alternatives in
the 2003 SEIS, and this constituted a fail-
ure to consider all reasonable alterna-
tives, as required by NEPA.166 The Fund
was successful on this claim, because
Judge Sullivan determined that the
“ample evidence that bison are adversely
affected by trail grooming is highly rele-
vant, and thus cannot be excluded from a
NEPA analysis without a cogent explana-
tion.”167 Therefore, the trail grooming
issue was remanded to the NPS because
the SEIS was “flatly inadequate under
NEPA.”168
Both plaintiffs argued that the con-
tinued snowmobiling and trail grooming
violated Yellowstone’s “conservation
mandate” evidenced in the Organic Act,
regulations, executive orders, and the
NPS Management Policies.169 Overall,
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158.  Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 108.
159. Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Norton, 304 F.
Supp. 2d 1278, 1294 (D. Wyo. 2004) (ordering a
preliminary injunction); see also Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs.
Ass’n v. Norton, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Wyo. 2004)
(Judge Brimmer’s order vacating the 2001
Snowcoach Rule and remand to NPS).
160.  2003 ROD, supra note 135, at 12 tbl.1. 
161.  The Greater Yellowstone Coalition
(“GYC”) is a “conservation organization dedicated
to protecting and restoring the Greater
Yellowstone ecosystem and the unique quality of
life it sustains.” Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at
97-98 (quoting the Plaintiff’s complaint).
162.  Id. at 96.  
163.  Id. at 98.
164.  Id.
165.  Id.
166.  Id. at 108. “Trail ‘grooming’ is the packing
of the snow along trails to facilitate winter use.”  Id.
at 97 n.2.  Trail grooming may present a problem in
Yellowstone because, as the court explained, the
“administrative record is ripe with studies indicat-
ing that winter park use, and especially trail groom-
ing, has lead [sic] to major changes in bison migra-
tion patters.”  Id. at 110 (citing Mary Meagher, Recent
Changes in Yellowstone Bison Numbers and Distribution, in
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, ADMIN. REC. 5329; Mary
Meagher, Winter Recreation-Induced Changes in Bison
Numbers and Distribution in Yellowstone National Park, in
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, ADMIN. REC. 5345).
167.  Id. at 111.
168.  Id. at 111 n.16.
169.  Id. at 102.  “In essence, plaintiffs argue[d]













the plaintiffs challenged the validity of
snowmobile presence in Yellowstone by
claiming it was inconsistent with the
Organic Act and administrative interpreta-
tion thereof.170 The NPS and interveners,
ISMA and the state of Wyoming,171
defended the rule change as within NPS’s
discretion and claimed that the introduc-
tion of mitigating solutions—namely, the
new four-stroke snowmobile engine tech-
nology, combined with guided tours—jus-
tified the policy shift of allowing snowmo-
biling in the Park.172
Judge Sullivan observed that the
“agency decision . . . amounts to a 180
degree reversal from a decision on the
same issue made by a previous adminis-
tration . . . conspicuously timed with the
change in administrations. . . .”173 To
ascertain whether the Bush
Administration’s reversal was permissible,
the court focused on an agency’s ability to
change course with political tides,
employing the Supreme Court’s height-
ened “reasoned analysis” standard, which
applies to such situations.174 This sec-
tion discusses Judge Sullivan’s analysis of
the NPS’s statutory mandate and his
application of the Supreme Court’s
heightened “reasoned analysis” standard
to assess the NPS’s change of course. 
1.  The National Park Service’s
Conservation Mandate
When determining whether an
agency has supplied the “reasoned analy-
sis for the change,” a court must first con-
sider the agency’s statutory directive.175
Judge Sullivan concluded that the Organic
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grooming and snowmobiling violate[d] the Park’s
conservation mandate, as codified in statutes, reg-
ulations, executive orders, and management poli-
cies.”  Id.
170.  Id.
171.  Id. at 98.
172.  Id. at 106-07.
173.  Id. at 105.
174.  Id. at 104 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at
41) (emphasis in original).  The opinion also dis-
cussed the NEPA claims from both the Fund and
GYC, as well as the Fund’s 1999 rulemaking peti-
tion.  294 F. Supp. 2d at 108–115. The Fund also
claimed that NPS failed to respond to the
Bluewater Network’s 1999 rulemaking petition
seeking to create regulations to eliminate snow-
mobiling in the park system as a whole was an
unreasonably delayed agency action under the
Administrative Procedure Act.  Id. at 112-13. See
generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1) (2000).  The
court determined while there was no time limit for
an agency to respond to rulemaking petitions, and
no promise that the petition would receive a favor-
able response, Bluewater Network was neverthe-
less entitled to an answer to the petition.  294 F.
Supp. 2d at 114.
GYC challenged the SEIS, asserting it “did not
consider the elevated risks for the Park’s most sus-
ceptible visitors and employees.”  Id. at 111-12.
This claim focused on NPS’s failure to use accurate
science to determine health effects and did not
dedicate adequate analysis to the health effects on
pregnant women, children, and the elderly.  Id.
However, Judge Sullivan was reluctant to intervene
in a “battle over proper scientific methodology”
and determined that NPS’s dedication of a SEIS
sub-section to health concerns met the purely pro-
cedural requirements of NEPA, and therefore was
not a NEPA violation.  Id.
The Supreme Court described typical defer-
ence as:
Normally an agency rule would be arbi-
trary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the prob-
lem, offered an explanation for its deci-
sion that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a differ-
ence in view or the product of agency
expertise.  
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.













Act binds the Service to a “conservation
mandate and that mandate trumps all
other considerations.”176 He noted that
this the NPS’s statutory authority is codi-
fied in the NPS Management Policies,177
Executive Orders 11,644 and 11,989,178
and the NPS snowmobile regulation,179
which collectively establish the NPS’s
preservation directive.180
Judge Sullivan first looked to
Congress’s language creating Yellowstone
and the Organic Act.181 In creating
Yellowstone, Congress directed NPS to
“preserve ‘from injury or spoliation’ the
‘wonders’ of the park and [to] insure ‘their
retention in their natural condition,’”182
and further to “‘provide against the wan-
ton destruction of the fish and game
found within the park, and against their
capture or destruction for the purposes of
merchandise or profit.’”183 Based on this
evidence, as well as precedent, the court
concluded that the Organic Act’s primary
purpose was conservation.184 The court
also determined that the NPS
Management Polices reflect the NPS’s
interpretation that it must prioritize
preservation in park management.185 In
fact, the 2003 ROD stated that the
Yellowstone National Park Act of 1872, the
NPS Organic Act, and the NPS
Management Policies emphasize that
“Congress has provided that when there is
a conflict between conserving resources
and values and providing for enjoyment of
them, conservation is to be the primary
concern.”186 Relying on these same doc-
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176.  Id. at 105-06.
177.  NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 5, ¶
1.4.3.
178.  Exec. Order No. 11,644, 37 Fed. Reg. 2877
(Feb. 8, 1972), as amended by Exec. Order No.
11,989, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,959 (May 24, 1977), reprint-
ed in note following 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1977).
179.  36 C.F.R. §2.18(c) (2005).
180.  Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 105-06.
181.  Id. at 102.
182.  Id. (quoting Yellowstone National Park
Act of 1872, 16 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).  Congress creat-
ed Yellowstone prior to NPS, but upon NPS’s cre-
ation, Congress placed Yellowstone under the
Service’s jurisdiction.  See 16 U.S.C. § 22 (estab-
lishing that Yellowstone was managed and regu-
lated by the Secretary of Interior); see also id. § 1
(later transferring the duty to regulate national
parks to the NPS).
183.  Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 102
(quoting 16 U.S.C. § 22).
184.  Id. at 105.  In determining that the con-
servation mandate “trumps all other considera-
tions,” Judge Sullivan relied in part on Potter, where
the court said “In the Organic Act Congress speaks
of but a single purpose, namely, conservation.” For
further discussion, see supra notes 70-73 and
accompanying text (same).
185.  Id. at 105.   The management policies
state that NPS “must always seek to avoid, or min-
imize to the greatest degree practicable adverse
impacts on park resources and values.”  Id.; NPS
MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 5, ¶ 1.4.3.  Judge
Sullivan continued to note the importance of the
NPS Management Policies by emphasizing its lan-
guage that the conservation mandate “applies at
all times, with respect to all park resources and
values, even when there is no risk that any park
resources or values may be impaired.”  294 F.
Supp. 2d at 103 (quoting NPS MANAGEMENT
POLICIES, supra note 5, ¶ 1.4.3).  The court interpret-
ed the NPS Management Policies to mean that the
NPS is required to protect the resources, minimize
adverse impacts, and when conservation and
enjoyment conflict, prioritize conservation.  Id.  See
also NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 5, ¶¶
1.4.3 (stating that “conservation is predominant,”);
1.4.6 (stating that “the park resources and values
that are subject to the no impairment standard
include . . . [o]pportunities to experience enjoy-
ment of the [park’s scenery, natural and historic
objects, and wildlife], to the extent that can be
done without impairing any of them”).
186.  2003 ROD, supra note 135, at 18.  Judge
Sullivan particularly focused on the phrase “con-
servation is to be the primary concern” in his
analysis.  294 F. Supp. 2d at 105 (quoting 2003













uments, Judge Sullivan ruled that preser-
vation was the priority in managing the
Park.187
Judge Sullivan also examined the
NPS snowmobile regulation and
Executive Orders controlling snowmobile
use in national parks.  The NPS snowmo-
bile regulation prohibits wildlife distur-
bance, allowing snowmobiles only when
the activity does not disturb park
resources and is consistent with park val-
ues.188 Presidents Nixon and Carter lim-
ited off-road vehicle use, including snow-
mobiles, in Executive Orders 11,644 and
11,989.189 Together, the executive orders
only allow minimal effects to natural
resources and wildlife, guaranteeing that
the effects will never be adverse.190 The
agency regulation and the executive
orders persuaded Judge Sullivan that “if it
is determined that snowmobile use has
an adverse effect on the Park’s resources,
or disturbs wildlife, the snowmobile use
must immediately cease.”191 Thus, in the
court’s view, the NPS’s primary concern in
managing Yellowstone was to ensure that
the natural resources remained unim-
paired.192
2.  No “Reasoned Analysis for the
Change”193
Typically, courts accord agency
actions considerable deference.  Once a
court determines “whether a decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment,”194 it can set aside an
agency action only when it is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-
erwise not in accordance with law.”195
Courts will essentially accept any plausi-
ble reasoning presented by the agency.196
But in order for an agency to deviate from
a prior rule, as in the Yellowstone snow-
mobiling situation, the agency’s burden is
elevated.  It must supply, in the words of
the Supreme Court, “a reasoned analysis
for the change beyond that which may be
required when an agency does not act in
the first instance.”197 The agency must
convince the court that there is a com-
pelling motive for the change.  Failure to
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187.  Id. at 108.
188.  Id. at 102–03.  See also 36 C.F.R. § 2.18(c)
(“Snowmobiles are prohibited except where desig-
nated and only when their use is consistent with
the park’s natural, cultural, scenic and aesthetic
values, safety considerations, park management
objectives, and will not disturb wildlife or damage
park resources”).  
189.  Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 102.
See generally Exec. Order No. 11,644, 37 Fed. Reg.
2877 (Feb. 8, 1972), as amended by Exec. Order
No. 11,989, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,959 (May 24, 1977),
reprinted in note following 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1977).
190.  Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 102.
Executive Order 11,989 provides that:
[W]henever [the Secretary] determines
that the use of off-road vehicles will cause
or is causing considerable adverse effects
on the soil, vegetation, wildlife, wildlife
habitat or cultural or historic resources of
particular areas or trails of the public
lands, [he shall] immediately close such
areas or trails to the type of off-road vehi-
cles. . . .
Exec. Order No. 11,989, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,959
(May 24, 1997), reprinted in note following 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1977).
191.  Fund forAnimals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
192.  Id. at 102-03.
193. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 49.
194.  Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
(quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
US. 402, 415-16 (1971)).
195.  Id.  (quoting Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000)).  
196.  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
197.  Fund forAnimals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 104.













meet this standard requires a court to
vacate the agency action.198
The Supreme Court announced this
heightened “reasoned analysis” standard
when an agency changes course because
“[t]here is … at least a presumption that
policies will be carried out best if the set-
tled rule is adhered to.”199 Therefore,
when an agency revokes or reverses a for-
mer view, the agency must “supply a rea-
soned analysis for the change.”200 The
Court recognized that agencies require
the flexibility to alter rules and policies,
but extensions and amendments are pre-
ferred to deregulation and rescission.201
Thus, for rule rescissions, the Court
required more than a rational connection
between facts presented and decision
made, requiring a “reasoned analysis”
instead.202
Judge Sullivan applied this height-
ened standard to the NPS’s issuance of
the 2003 Final Rule by analyzing the 2001
and 2003 rules, the conservation man-
date, and the previous decision that
snowmobiling was an impairment.203 He
concluded that the Service failed to sup-
ply any reasoning “to explain this 180
degree reversal.”204 The court observed
that, in 2001, the NPS had eliminated
snowmobiling from Yellowstone to com-
ply with the Park’s statutory and regulato-
ry requirements.205 According to Judge
Sullivan, NPS concluded that snowmobil-
ing impaired Yellowstone by adversely
affecting the Park’s wildlife, air quality,
and natural soundscapes and odors.206
The court then analyzed the NPS rule
change a scant three years later, which
relied largely on the “availability of clean-
er, quieter snowmobiles”207 and the use
of guided group tours.208 Judge Sullivan
rejected the Service’s dependence on
these justifying alterations as “weak at
best.”209 He observed that the 2001
Snowcoach Rule acknowledged that even
with new cleaner and quieter snowmobile
technology—such as the four-stroke
engine—the improvements would do lit-
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198.  Id.
199.  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42 (quoting
Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S.
800, 807-808 (1973)).
200.  Id. at 42.
201.  Id. 
202.  Id. The Supreme Court vacated the
agency action in State Farm because the agency did
not amend the rule, it simply accommodated
industry’s economic pressures and, without a rea-
soned explanation, it dismissed the known bene-
fits of the previous rule, which accomplished the
statutory directive.  Id. at 46-56.  An additional
note about the State Farm concerns Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent.  While concurring in part, his
dissent emphasized that “[t]he agency’s changed
view of the standard seems to be related to the
election of a new President of a different political
party.” Id. at 59.  The dissent was not troubled by
this reality because “people casting their votes is a
perfectly reasonable basis for an executive
agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its
programs and regulations.” Id.  Although Justice
Rehnquist accepted that agency rule rescissions
occur with a change in the political tides, the State
Farm majority required the agency to articulate the
higher standard of a “reasoned analysis” for its rule
shift beyond what it would demonstrate when it
had initially promulgated the rule. Id. at 42.
203.  Fund forAnimals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
204.  Id. at 108 (“In light of its clear conserva-
tion mandate, and the previous conclusion that
snowmobile use amounted to unlawful impair-
ment, the Agency is under an obligation to explain
this 180 degree reversal.  NPS has not met this
obligation.”).
205.  Id. at 106.
206.  Id.
207.  Id.
208.  Id. at 107.













tle to minimize the impairment.210
Moreover, the court relied on the fact that
the 2003 Final Rule expressly accepted
this information in the 2000 Record of
Decision (“2000 ROD”) and FEIS as accu-
rate.211 Additionally, during the 2003
rulemaking process, the EPA confirmed
that the FEIS accurately projected the
technological improvements; thus, the
alleged “new” technological improve-
ments in the 2003 Final Rule did not justi-
fy the policy reversal.212 EPA’s findings,
along with the 2003 Final Rule’s adoption
of the 2000 ROD and FEIS, persuaded
Judge Sullivan that the new four-stroke
engine technology did not support allow-
ing snowmobiling to continue in
Yellowstone.213
The 2003 Final Rule also justified
continued snowmobiling with guided
tours, concluding that the tours would
“mitigate snowmobiler interaction with
wildlife . . . .”214 Judge Sullivan concluded
that this theory was flawed because: 1) the
daily limits actually increased snowmo-
bile use, rather than decreased it because
the rule only ensured that the daily limits
“‘[did] not exceed the current average
throughout the West Entrances’ and actu-
ally ‘allow[ed] for modest increases at the
other entrances and road segments;’”215
2) the definition of groups (one to eleven
snowmobilers) allowed solo snowmobile
travel, and therefore eliminated the bene-
fits of group travel; and 3) oral communi-
cation was difficult to impossible with a
one-third mile distance between snowmo-
biles, and therefore negated the benefits
of a guide.216 Therefore, the court reject-
ed the mitigation rationale as inadequate
to eliminate snowmobiles’ impairment on
Yellowstone’s resources.
Ultimately, Judge Sullivan rejected
NPS’s new impairment interpretation
because the 2003 Final Rule primarily
benefitted “the park visitors who ride
snowmobiles in the parks and the busi-
nesses that serve them,” rather than
Yellowstone’s natural resources.217
According to the court, the NPS’s explana-
tion for the 2003 rule change was “weak at
best” and failed to provide a “reasoned
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210.  Id.  “The 2001 Snowcoach Rule states
that: ‘Some newer snowmobiles have promise for
reducing some impacts, but not enough for the
use of large numbers of those machines to be con-
sistent with the applicable legal requirements.
Clean, quieter snowmobiles would do little, if anything, to
reduce the most serious impacts on wildlife.’”  Id. at 106
(emphasis in original) (quoting 2001 Snowcoach
Rule, supra note 23, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7260).
211.  Id. at 106.  “Significantly, this conclusion
[that clean, quieter snowmobiles would do little, if
anything, to reduce the most serious impacts on
wildlife] was never found to be erroneous, as the
2000 EIS and ROD were expressly adopted during
the 2003 rulemaking process.”  Id.  See 2003 ROD,
supra note 135, at 7 n.3 (“The SEIS is a supplement to
the Final EIS per the settlement, and the context
in which it is being written is the acceptance of
new data, not a conclusion that the Final EIS and
ROD are incorrect as alleged in the ISMA litiga-
tion.”) (emphasis in original).
212.  Id. at 107.  The EPA commented during
the 2003 rulemaking process that “the FEIS [was]
remarkably accurate in setting and analyzing emis-




215.  Id. 
216.  Id.  (“Given that the Final Rule only
requires snowmobilers to stay within one-third of
a mile of the first snowmobiler in the group (pre-
sumably the guide), these oral communication dif-
ficulties apply with equal force.”); see also id. at 107
n.10 (“Defendants [also] assert[ed] that communi-
cation will occur via hand signals, but given the
allowance of a one-third of a mile gap between the
guide and a snowmobiler, the efficacy of this
method of communication is also questionable.”).  













analysis” for the “stark” difference
between the 2001 and 2003 rules.218 The
Service did not satisfy the “reasoned
analysis” standard established in the
Supreme Court’s 1984 State Farm decision
because the 2003 Final Rule accepted the
information within the 2000 ROD and
FEIS as accurate.219 Moreover, NPS relied
on flawed mitigation logic.220 Therefore,
Judge Sullivan invalidated the Bush
Administration’s rule as “quintessentially
arbitrary and capricious.”221
B.  The Wyoming District Court’s Order
After Judge Sullivan’s December 2003
order, environmentalists cheered because
they believed snowmobiling in the treas-
ured park was a thing of the past.  But the
snowmobile industry and the state of
Wyoming responded by reopening their
challenge to the 2001 Snowcoach Rule in
Wyoming District Court.222 The court had
retained jurisdiction over the 2001
Snowcoach Rule as a result of the earlier
litigation, which was stayed after the par-
ties reached the 2001 settlement promis-
ing the SEIS and the ensuing 2003 Final
Rule.223 Judge Clarence Brimmer subse-
quently enjoined implementation of the
2001 Snowcoach Rule on February 10,
2004—less than two months after Judge
Sullivan’s order.224
Judge Brimmer concluded he had
jurisdiction to hear ISMA’s and the state
of Wyoming’s (collectively the “plaintiffs”)
request for a preliminary injunction
because Judge Sullivan ruled only on the
validity of the 2003 Final Rule, while the
Wyoming court order was “separate and
distinct” because it only concerned the
validity of the 2001 Snowcoach Rule.225 A
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218.  Id. at 107-08. Judge Sullivan accurately
noted that “[i]ndeed, there is evidence in the
Record that there isn’t an explanation for this
change, and that the SEIS was completely politi-
cally driven and result oriented.” Id. at 108 n.11.
He relied on the following two pieces of evidence:
(1) the NPS “‘internal objective’ [was] ‘ to deter-
min[e] under what terms and conditions snowmo-
biling will continue in the three parks,’ and the
external objective [was] ‘whether to affirm the pre-
vious decision or to make a new one,’” id. (quoting
NPS Meeting Agency for June 3, in NATIONAL PARK
SERVICE, ADMIN. REC. 51,392); and (2) a “participant
in NPS meeting noted that ‘Gale Norton wants to
be able to come away saying some snowmobiles
are allowed.’”  Id. (quoting NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
ADMIN. REC. 51,392).
219.  Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 107-08.
220.  Id. at 108.
221.  Id.
222.  See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying
text (discussing ISMA’s challenge and settlement).
223.  Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs., 304 F. Supp. 2d at
1283-84.  See also supra notes 98-100 and accompa-
nying text (discussing ISMA’s challenge and settle-
ment).  On December 6, 2000, ISMA and the state
of Wyoming filed suit in Judge Brimmer’s Wyoming
District Court challenging the validity of the 2001
Snowcoach Rule; GYC intervened as a defendant
in this action.  Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs., 304 F. Supp. 2d
at 1283-84.  In June 2001, ISMA and Wyoming set-
tled with the federal defendants (GYC was not part
of the settlement).  Id.  Under the settlement
agreement, NPS agreed to prepare the SEIS evalu-
ating the new four-stroke engine technology, which
the Wyoming District Court determined was not
included in the FEIS.  Id. The parties requested
that the Wyoming court stay the litigation pending
SEIS completion.  Id.
224.  Id. at 1294.
225.  Id. at 1285. Judge Brimmer’s order first
considered the question of jurisdiction, because
the GYC challenged that “any injunction granted
by [the Wyoming court] would directly conflict
with the mandatory injunction issued by” Judge
Sullivan in the District of Columbia District Court.
Id.  The Wyoming court responded by stating that
Judge Sullivan’s order was not applicable because
the District of Columbia order invalidated the 2003
Final Rule, SEIS, and 2003 ROD, and simply
replaced the rulemaking process with the 2001
Snowcoach Rule.  Judge Brimmer made clear that













preliminary injunction requires that the
requesting party carry the burden to
prove: 1) a substantial likelihood of suc-
cess; 2) irreparable harm; 3) that the bal-
ance of harm favors injunction; and 4) that
if issued, the injunction will not harm the
public interest.226 This section discusses
Judge Brimmer’s findings in each of the
above factors in the order that the Judge
discussed them and the resulting prelimi-
nary injunction.
First, the court determined that the
plaintiffs experienced irreparable injury
from implementation of the 2001
Snowcoach Rule, despite the Tenth Circuit
rule that “injury will not be considered
irreparable if monetary damages would be
adequate to provide relief . . . .”227 The
plaintiffs claimed they would suffer “mil-
lions of lost dollars,” in labor, income and
tax revenue, and because of investments
in the conversion to the four-stroke
engine snowmobiles, all potentially lead-
ing to bankruptcy for many local busi-
nesses due in part to lost good will.228
Judge Brimmer emphasized that this
analysis did not apply to just one busi-
ness, but a whole group who supplied
services to Yellowstone’s snowmobil-
ers.229 Therefore, relying greatly on lan-
guage from an earlier Tenth Circuit deci-
sion,230 the court determined that the
“irreparable injury factor weighs heavily in
favor of granting the requested prelimi-
nary injunction.”231
Second, in determining whether the
harm to the Plaintiffs outweighed that to
GYC, Judge Brimmer balanced the
“alleged [environmental] harm”232 to the
local business’s “extreme financial dis-
tress.”233 Although the court believed
that the health risks and noise pollution
would probably escalate with increased
numbers of snowmobiles, despite the
reduced pollution from the four-stroke
engine technology,234 Judge Brimmer
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tion the validity and wisdom of the District of
Columbia court’s decision, noting that “[t]hese
two issues are separate and distinct and there are
no issues of judicial comity presented by this
Court deciding the validity of the 2001 Snowcoach
Rule.”  Id. Further, Judge Brimmer agreed with
Judge Sullivan’s acceptance that federal comity
applies only when the identical suit is filed in two
separate federal courts, which was not the case in
the Yellowstone litigation.  Id. Therefore, since the
2001 settlement agreement had not been fully
completed because the SEIS was not finalized, the
Wyoming court retained “jurisdiction over the
issue of the validity of the 2001 Snowcoach [R]ule
and ha[d] the proper authority to grant a prelimi-
nary injunction in [the] matter.”  Id. at 1285-86.
The federal-comity doctrine is “between federal
district courts … [with] the general principal … to
avoid duplicative litigation.”  Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816
(1976). 
226. Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
227.  Id.
228.  Id. at 1287.
229.  Id.
230.  See Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n,
Inc. v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 356
(10th Cir. 1986) (“A threat to trade or business via-
bility may constitute irreparable harm”).  Judge
Brimmer also relied on Zurn Constructors, Inc. v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 685 F. Supp. 1172, 1181 (D.Kan. 1988),
which states that “loss of customers, loss of good-
will, and threats to a business’ viability can consti-
tute irreparable harm.”  Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs., 304 F.
Supp. 2d at 1287.  Apparently the loss of goodwill
persuaded Judge Brimmer to grant the preliminary
injunction, despite the determination that
irreparable harm would not occur with purely
monetary damages.  Id. at 1286 (“Generally injury
will not be considered irreparable if monetary
damages would be adequate to provide    relief . .
. .”).
231. Id. at 1287.















ruled that the financial loss to local busi-
ness owners was paramount.235 He rea-
soned that the potential loss of goodwill
and bankruptcy presented more definite
injuries.236 The court therefore concluded
that ISMA’s economic concerns surpassed
park ranger respiratory complications, the
degraded air quality from snowmobile
pollution, and the other environmental
harms associated with snowmobile
use.237
Third, Judge Brimmer examined
whether issuing a preliminary injunction
was in the public interest.  The parties
presented the court two conflicting views
of the public interest: 1) protecting the
local economies; and 2) protecting public
heath and preserving Yellowstone’s
resources.238 Judge Brimmer concluded,
with no substantive explanation, that the
true public interest supported protection
of the local business owners.239 He
fumed that a “single Eastern district judge
shouldn’t have the unlimited power to
impose the old 2001 rule on the public
and the business community . . . .”240 The
rushed manner241 in which Judge
Sullivan’s order imposed the 2001
Snowcoach Rule on Yellowstone’s gate-
way communities also tipped the public
interest towards favoring a grant of a pre-
liminary injunction.242
Finally, Judge Brimmer concluded by
determining the plaintiffs’ likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits.  The court ascertained
that because of the “tremendous impact” on
the businesses, visitors, and surrounding
communities, the plaintiffs were likely to
succeed on the merits.243 First, according
to Judge Brimmer, NPS failed to take a “hard
look” at the snowcoach alternative because
the Service inadequately considered snow-
coaches’ environmental and safety benefits,
and because four-stroke engine snowmo-
biles polluted less than the NPS originally
believed.244 Second, the court concluded
that the 2001 Snowcoach Rule was a “pre-
judged political decision,” which would be
found arbitrary and capricious after a full
review of the administrative record.245
Third, Judge Brimmer determined that the
state agencies received a deficient comment




238.  Id. at 1289. (“Wyoming and ISMA
Plaintiffs argue that public policy favors protecting
local economies preserving public assess to the
National Parks and preserving the public process
for agency decision making.  The GYC Defendant-
Intervenors assert that public policy is in favor of
protecting public health and the integrity of our
first National Park.”).
239.  Id. (stating that the “[p]ublic interest is
served by protecting the business owners and con-
cessionaires who relied on the NPS’s proposed
regulations”).
240.  Id.
241.  According to Judge Brimmer, Judge
Sullivan’s decision invalidating the 2003 Final Rule
was “released the night before the snowmobile
season was to begin….”  Id. 
242.  Id.
243.  Id. at 1289.
244.  Id. at 1290-91. The term “hard look” refers
to “[t]he sweeping policy goals announced in [sec-
tion] 101 of NEPA [that] are thus realized through
a set of ‘action-forcing’ procedures that require
that agencies take a ‘hard look at environmental
consequences,’ and that provide for broad dissem-
ination of relevant environmental information.”
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 350 (1989) (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).
245.  Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1290.
Judge Brimmer offered only one example from the
administrative record to support this conclusion,
stating that “[i]n April 2002, Assistant Secretary Barry
issued a memorandum to the NPS directing them to
prohibit snowmobile access in national park units.
This memorandum came after the September 29,
1999 Draft EIS, which concluded that snowmobile













period when the NPS proposed the ban on
snowmobiles in the FEIS.246 This change,
according to the court, violated the require-
ment that cooperating agencies247 partici-
pate meaningfully in the commenting
process.248 Fourth, according to Judge
Brimmer, the rushed administrative process
creating the 2001 Snowcoach Rule also did
not allow the public sufficient time to com-
ment, violating NEPA.249 Finally, the court
ascertained that the 2001 Snowcoach Rule
violated the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”)250 because NPS never offered a
“rational connection” for the “sudden” deci-
sion eliminating snowmobiles from
Yellowstone; the court therefore determined
that the NPS’s 2001 actions were“arbitrary
and capricious.”251 In sum, Judge Brimmer
concluded that the NPS’s failure to comply
with NEPA and APA requirements meant
Hillary Prugh Volume 11, Number 2
246.  Id.  See NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, RECORD OF
DECISION, WINTER USE PLANS FOR THE YELLOWSTONE AND
GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARKS AND THE JOHN D.
ROCKEFELLER JR., MEMORIAL PARKWAY 18, 38 (2000),
available at http://www.planning.nps.gov/docu-
ment/yellrodwinteruse%2E.pdf (last visited Feb. 14,
2005). “The overwhelming negative reaction to the
preferred alternative B in the draft EIS, which would
have plowed the road from West Yellowstone to Old
Faithful, was a factor in considering a new preferred
alternative for the final EIS.” Id. at 18.  NPS therefore
chose alternative G, the environmentally preferred
alternative, which phased out snowmobiling in
Yellowstone.  Id. at 38.
247.  Lead agencies are those that “supervise
the preparation of an environmental impact state-
ment [EIS]….”  40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(a) (2005).  In EIS
preparation the lead agency requests assistance
from cooperating agencies, which are those agen-
cies that have jurisdiction by law over the project,
a special expertise, or those who request this des-
ignation.  Id. § 1501.6.  Also, “[s]tate and local
agencies which are authorized to develop and
enforce environmental standards” are invited to
comment during the EIS process.  Id. §
1503.1(a)(2)(i).  
248.  Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs., 304 F. Supp. 2d at
1291.  According to Judge Brimmer, the cooperat-
ing agencies were aware of this change on March
13, 2000, and comments were due on March 24,
2000.  The Governors of Montana, Idaho, and
Wyoming protested this short comment period,
and Judge Brimmer agreed that the short comment
period violated the NEPA requirement to have a
meaningful opportunity to comment.  Id.  See 40
C.F.R. § 1501.7(a)(1) (“As part of the scoping
process the lead agency shall:  (1) Invite the par-
ticipation of affected Federal, State, and local
agencies.”). 
249.  Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs., 304 F. Supp. 2d at
1292.  The court determined that the public only had
one day to comment on the FEIS and thirty days to
comment on the 2001 Proposed Rule. Id.  On the last
day of the Clinton Administration, the day after the
2000 Proposed Rule’s comment period closed, the
2001 Snowcoach Rule was released.  The court cor-
rectly opined that this was an inadequate time peri-
od to fully consider the 5,000 comments received,
many on the day prior to the final rule’s issuance.  Id.
However, it is important to note that while Judge
Brimmer believed that there was a NEPA violation
because of an inadequate comment period, the
Council on Environmental Quality regulations—the
regulations implementing the NEPA process—do
not require a specific time frame for commenting.
“[T]he council … decided that prescribed universal
time limits for the entire NEPA process are too
inflexible….”  40 C.F.R. § 1501.8.    
250.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335,
5372, 7521 (2000).
251.  Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs., 304 F. Supp. 2d at
1292.  In reaching the conclusion that the NPS’s
actions were arbitrary and capricious, the court
primarily relied on the lack of public participation
and the ten-month period during which NPS
moved from unlimited snowmobiling to elimina-
tion, which was not fully explained.  Id. Unlike
Judge Sullivan, Judge Brimmer did not rely on the
State Farm “reasoned analysis” standard, but rather
only determined that there was a lack of  a “ration-
al connection between the facts found and the
choice made.”  Id. (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at
43).  The Supreme Court differentiated between
these two standards in State Farm, describing the
“rational connection” standard as typical agency
deference, and the “reasoned analysis” standard as
an elevated standard when an agency changes
course.  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 40, 43.  Therefore,
that the plaintiffs were likely to be success-
ful on the merits.252
According to Judge Brimmer, deter-
mining the appropriate remedy was “[o]ne
of the most difficult issues in this case . . .
.” 253 Either reverting to the 2003 Final
Rule or the pre-2001 winter use plan was
the first option before the court.254 But
Judge Brimmer was reluctant to reinstate
the 2003 Final Rule because this action
directly conflicted with Judge Sullivan’s
earlier ruling.255 The court also strongly
implied that the pre-2001 Snowcoach
Rule illegally impaired Yellowstone, and
therefore violated the Organic Act—
although Judge Brimmer did not expand
on the reasons why “unrestricted snow-
mobile use” impaired Yellowstone’s
resources.256 With no viable alternative
available, Judge Brimmer deferred to the
NPS’s expertise, ordering the agency to
craft temporary snowmobile regulations
for the remainder of the 2003-2004 winter
season to benefit both Yellowstone’s eco-
nomic and environmental interests.257
Pursuant to Judge Brimmer’s order, the
NPS promulgated snowmobile regula-
tions that increased daily snowmobile
entries from 493 to 780.258 The addition-
al 287 snowmobiles were required to have
four-stroke engine meeting the “best
available technology.”259
V.  The Future of Snowmobiling in
Yellowstone
The confusion over the status of
snowmobiling in Yellowstone did not end
with Judge Brimmer’s February 2004 order.
On February 17, 2004, one week after the
Wyoming District Court order, Judge
Sullivan decried the NPS’s temporary reg-
ulation, which nearly doubled the daily
allowable snowmobile entrances into
Yellowstone, as “a nonchalant attitude of
the government to a federal judge’s
order.”260 Nevertheless, in an early March
2004 contempt of court hearing, Judge
Sullivan declined to hold the NPS in con-
tempt due to the rapidly dwindling snow-
mobile season and the appeal of Judge
Brimmer’s decision pending in the Tenth
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the NPS must present a more substantial explana-
tion justifying the 2003 Final Rule than the 2001
Snowcoach Rule. See also supra notes 185-93 and
accompanying text.
252.  Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs.,  304 F. Supp. 2d at
1293.
253.  Id. 
254.  Id.
255.  Id. 
256. Id.  It is curious that Judge Brimmer
implied that the pre-2001 Snowcoach Rule caused
impairment, after articulating the deficiencies in
the 2001 Snowcoach Rule, which was created to
eliminate impairment.  Judge Brimmer, however,
did not expand his reasoning to articulate what
would impair Yellowstone’s resources or what
would avoid impairment–one can only assume that
it lies somewhere between “unrestricted snowmo-
bile use” and the phase-out within 2001
Snowcoach Rule.
257.  Id.
258.  National Park Service, U.S. Dept. of
Interior, Yellowstone National Park, Winter Use
Background Information, at http://www.nps.gov/
yell/planvisit/winteruse/background.htm (last
updated Dec. 22, 2004).
259.  Id.  For further discussion about the
snowmobiling rulemakings and litigation, see
Michael C. Blumm, The Bush Administration’s
Sweetheart Settlement Policy: A Trojan Horse Strategy for
Advancing Commodity Production on Public Lands, 34
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,397, 10,415-19 (2004).  
260.  John Heilprin, Judge Blasts New Sled Rules,
CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, Feb. 18, 2004, at
http:/ /www.casperstartr ibune.net/articles/
2004/02/18/news/296e8d1fcee9924d87256e3e000d
a142.txt (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
261.  See Ted Monoson, Judge Delays Contempt
Ruling, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, Mar. 10, 2005, at
http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2004/03/
tempt decision, Judge Sullivan vowed that
the NPS’s rejection of his order would be
eventually “set straight.”262 Additionally,
in late August 2004, the NPS released a
“Temporary Winter Use Plans
Environmental Assessment” (“EA”)
designed to control Yellowstone winter
management through the 2006-2007 winter
season.263 The preferred alternative of the
EA allowed 720 snowmobiles daily.264 All
snowmobiles would have to include the
“best available technology” and would be
commercially guided.265 Further, at the
end of 2004, Congress passed an appropri-
ations rider eliminating the NPS’s ability to
lower this daily limit, halting all litigation
efforts until the 2005 fiscal year.266
Clearly there remains substantial
debate about managing the competing
interests of preventing adverse economic
impacts to local economies and preventing
impairment of the Park’s resources.   Yet,
the Organic Act undoubtedly establishes
the conservation mandate recognized by
Judge Sullivan.267 Additionally, the drafters
of the Organic Act intended that national
parks remain immune from economic con-
siderations, such as those emphasized by
the Bush Administration.268 To illustrate
the statutory priority of preventing impair-
ment to park resources, and to determine
the future of snowmobiling in Yellowstone,
this section discusses the real issue which
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10/news/wyoming/c4e12f5445927cbb87256e530006
914c.txt (last visited Apr. 16, 2005) (Judge Sullivan
said, “It is the better part of wisdom to put on hold
any issues of contempt.”) ; Earthjustice,
Conservationists Appeal Judge’s Decision to Lift Snowmobile
Phaseout, at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/dis-
play.html?ID=779 (last visited Apr. 16, 2005)
(Appellants are GYC, National Parks Conservation
Association, The Wilderness Society, Natural
Resources Defense Council, Winter Wildlands
Alliance, and Sierra Club.).  Also, in March 2004,
ISMA had a pending motion for a new trial in Judge
Sullivan’s court.  E-mail from Barbara A. Miller,
Attorney for ISMA, to Hillary Prugh, author (Mar. 19,
2004 06:19:00 PST) (on file with author). 
262.  Monoson, supra note 261.
263.  National Park Service, U.S. Dept. of the
Interior, Winter Use Status, Winter Use Plans
Environmental Assessment Comment and Proposed Rule,
at http://www.nps.gov/yell/planvisit/winteruse/
index.htm (last updated Dec. 22, 2004) [hereinafter
Winter Use Plans EA Comment].
264.  Id.  See also NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, U.S.
DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, TEMPORARY WINTER USE PLANS
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE GRAND TETON AND
YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARKS AND THE JOHN D.
ROCKEFELLER, JR. MEMORIAL PARKWAY 1 (2004), available
at http://www.nps.gov/yell/planvisit/winteruse/ tem-
pwinteruseeae8-18.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2005). 
265. Winter Use Plans EA Comment, supra note
263. The NPS issued a final rule on November 10,
2004.  Id. Also, the announcement noted that the
NPS contracted with an independent researcher to
assess the effect of trail grooming on bison distri-
bution and abundance, as well as bison use of
groomed trails.  Id. However, this information
would not be available until after the conclusion of
the EA process. Id.
266.  Press Release, United States Senator
Conrad Burns, Burns: Omnibus Bill Finalized (Nov. 22,
2004)  (“Yellowstone Snowmobiling: Included in
the package is language that ensures a continued
ability to snowmobile within Yellowstone National
Park through this winter’s tourism season.  Burns
said, ‘Last year, mid-way through the winter, a
Washington D.C. judge temporarily suspended all
snowmobiling within the park.  That action was
devastating to West Yellowstone businesses, and
the scores of families who were unable to enjoy
the park.  The language I’ve included works to pro-
tect those local businesses and economies by
ensuring that, if snowmobiles are challenged in
such a way again, the decision to remove them
can’t be implemented until the following sea-
son.’”), at http://burns.senate.gov/index.cfm?
FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_i
d=1216&Month=11&Year=2004 (last visited Apr.
20, 2005). 
267.  See supra notes 176-92 and accompanying
text (discussing the NPS’s “conservation mandate”).
268.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text
(discussing Representative Kent’s intent).
fully addressed—the application of the
impairment standard to Yellowstone.
Scholars have described the Organic
Act’s directive as a “contradictory man-
date,”269 of which the Yellowstone snow-
mobiling debate presents a prime exam-
ple.  The snowmobilers emphasize the
Act’s mention of “enjoyment of future gen-
erations,” while preservationists focus on
the requirement that the NPS leave park
resources “unimpaired.”270 But when
there is a conflict between these two
philosophies as in Yellowstone, the NPS
Management Policies, interpreting the
Organic Act, dictate that “conservation is
to be predominant.”271 The Organic Act’s
prohibition of impairment represents the
NPS’s primary duty.272
However, dealing in generalities begs
the question: when must the NPS prohib-
it an activity that would cause impair-
ment?  The plain language and legislative
history of the Organic Act provide no
definitive guidance for determining
whether activities impair parks, as the
courts have recognized.273 But, the
drafter of the “non-impairment” clause,
Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., suggested a
“common sense approach” to which we
can turn.274 Snowmobiling in
Yellowstone fails nearly all of Olmsted’s
aforementioned criteria for determining
an impairment.  Regarding Olmsted’s sec-
ond criteria,275 snowmobiling is not of
high social importance, as evidenced by
80 percent of Yellowstone’s interested
public supporting snowmobile elimina-
tion.276 Regarding Olmsted’s third and
fourth criterion,277 snowmobiling endan-
gers Yellowstone’s wilderness values and
snowmobiling represents an unsuitable
activity for the Park because it prevents
visitors from experiencing the Park’s
silence and even from clearly viewing the
Park’s iconic natural wonders, as well as
forcing Yellowstone park rangers to wear
gas masks while at work.278 And finally,
regarding Olmsted’s fifth criteria,279













Spring 2005 The Snowmobiling Saga in Yellowstone National Park
269.  See, e.g., Winks, supra note 38, at 575
(“Historians concerned with the National Park
Service, managers in the Park Service, and critics
and defenders of the Service, frequently state that
the Organic Act which brought the National Park
Service into existence in 1916 contains a ‘contra-
dictory mandate.’”).
270.  See generally, Scheg, supra note 18, at 51-52
(discussing the different national park use per-
spectives between those who promote recreation
verses preservation). 
271.  NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 5, ¶
1.4.3.
272.  Id. ¶ 1.4.4.
273.  See, e.g., supra notes 68-81 and accom-
panying text (discussing judicial interpretations).
274.  See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying
text (discussing Olmsted’s influence on the
Organic Act).
275.  See supra note 43 and accompanying text
(“[T]he activity must have high social importance
to occur inside park boundaries.”).
276.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text
(discussing the 2003 Final Rule’s comment period
where 80% of 350,000 comments supported imple-
mentation of the 2001 Snowcoach Rule).
277.  See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying
text (“[T]he activity cannot ‘endanger the value of
the park for its proper purpose to the slightest
appreciable degree’” and “the activity must be
suitable for the park.”).
278.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text
(discussing inability to see Old Faithful); JANSSEN &
SCHETTLER, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing park
rangers use of gas masks, “respiratory masks,” and
charcoal lined paper masks).  See also Booth, supra
note 110 (“park rangers wearing gas masks gasping
at the West Gate”).
279.  See supra note 45 and accompany text
(“[T]he importance of the activity which causes the
impairment must be of greater value than the
park’s purposes to justify the impairment.”).
Park’s purposes because snowmobilers
can pursue their chosen recreation in
areas outside Yellowstone, which are not
specifically designated for scenery and
wildlife conservation.280
The NPS has prohibited snowmobil-
ing in several other national parks.281 In
1987, the Service also promulgated a reg-
ulation eliminating snowmobiles from all
national parks, unless consistent with an
individual park’s values.282 Additionally,
the EPA has consistently recognized
snowmobiling’s adverse affects on other-
wise pristine airscapes.283 The NPS has
previously restricted mountain biking,
hunting, and trapping in national
parks.284 The NPS regulated these activi-
ties in less historic and arguably less
important parks than Yellowstone, the
world’s first national park.285 In addition
to the statutory language forbidding
impairment,286 these examples of the
NPS’s wholesale prohibitions of activities
that cause impairment underscore the
need to eliminate snowmobiling from per-
haps one of the most celebrated ecosys-
tems left in the national park system.
Finally, the NPS’s economic justifica-
tions—the “extreme financial distress” of
the local economies—advanced under the
Bush administration for maintaining
snowmobiling in Yellowstone do not pass
muster because preservation, rather than
economic considerations, represent NPS’s
principal concern.287 Furthermore, we
ought to pay heed to the explicit asser-
tions of the father of NPS, Representative
Kent, in assessing the role of economics
in national park administration.  He
believed that the Service must resist local
community pressures because the parks
were intended to be a reserve, not a
tourist attraction.288 Other commenta-
tors share Kent’s view that the parks were
created primarily for non-economic pur-
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280.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (national parks’ purpose
is “to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wild life therein . . .”)
281.  See Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661, 670
(8th Cir.) (affirming NPS decision to eliminate
snowmobiling from Voyageurs National Park, in
Minnesota, because of snowmobiling’s adverse
effects on that park’s resources such as the gray
wolf); 36 C.F.R. 13.63(h) (2005) (eliminating snow-
mobiling in Denali National Park because it is “not
a traditional activity” and thus cannot occur with-
in the boundaries of the “Old Park” (area formally
known as Mt. McKinley National Park)).
282.  36 C.F.R. §2.18(c) (2005).  The NPS deter-
mined that the snowmobiling allowed in the 2003
Final Rule was not likely to impair the Park’s values.
2003 Final Rule, supra note 29, 68 Fed. Reg. at 69,269.
283.  See supra notes 30, 119, 212 and accom-
panying text (discussing EPA’s comments that
Yellowstone possibly exceeded the allowable
increase in particulate matter under the Clean Air
Act’s ‘Prevention of Significant Deterioration’ pro-
gram); see also supra note 212 and accompanying
text (stating that “during the 2003 rulemaking
process, EPA confirmed that the FEIS accurately
projected the technological improvements, [and
that] thus the alleged ‘new’ technological
improvements in the 2003 Final Rule did not elim-
inate the need for a snowmobile phase-out”); see
also Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 24 (D.D.C.
2004) (affirming the EPA’s authority to regulate
carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions
from snowmobiles).
284.  See Bicycle Trails, 82 F.3d at 1454 (mountain
biking); Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 909 (hunting and
trapping); Mich. United Conservation Clubs, 949 F.2d at
207 (hunting and trapping).
285.  YNP Facts, supra note 1.
286.  16 U.S.C. § 1.
287.  Doremus, supra note 48, at 487.
288.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text
(“NPS must resist surrounding communities’ pres-
sures to transform the park into primarily a tourist
attraction.”).
gested that the national parks were creat-
ed to establish a sense of national identi-
ty.289 While Europe had history and cul-
ture, which this country could not rival,
the United States had “spectacular
national wonders.”290 The parks were cre-
ated to emphasize that this nation valued
something other than materialism and
monetary wealth.291 To be true to
Representative Kent’s vision for the
National Park System, economic interests
that the Bush administration finds com-
pelling cannot override an impairment
determination.
The legacy of our national parks is
diminished when the NPS authorizes uses
such as snowmobiling, which impair the
very wonders that Yellowstone was created
to protect.292 The Organic Act,293 the
Yellowstone National Park Act of 1872,294
Executive Orders 11,644 and 11,989,295 the
NPS snowmobile regulation,296 and NPS
Management Policies297 prioritize preser-
vation of the Park in its natural state.  These
directives prohibit the NPS from allowing
future snowmobiling in Yellowstone.
VI.  Conclusion
The roller coaster that snowmobiling
in Yellowstone has become epitomizes
the dangers of political decisionmaking
that the Supreme Court struck down with
its 1984 State Farm decision.298 The NPS
under the Bush administration relied on
the same information which it had used
earlier to determine that snowmobiling
impaired Yellowstone.299 The NPS pre-
sented no new information and ignored
the Organic Act’s “conservation man-
date.”300 Not only did the Bush adminis-
tration ignore this well-established man-
date, but so did Judge Brimmer in the
Wyoming District Court.  The Wyoming
District Court erroneously accepted the
Bush administration’s reliance on eco-
nomic considerations irrelevant in an
Organic Act analysis, providing only con-
clusory statements as rationale.301 This
nonchalant interpretation of the Organic
Act sets dangerous precedent endanger-
ing all of our national parks.  
The United Stated is blessed with
outstanding natural wonders, with which
many countries cannot compare.302
When the Service manages our parks in
such a way as to result in air pollution
rivaling Los Angeles during rush hour traf-
fic,303 it eviscerates the unprecedented
forethought of the parks’ founders.304
Congress established the NPS to protect
rather than destroy a park’s resources.
Consideration of local economies has no
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289.  Doremus, supra note 48, at 440.
290.  Id.
291.  Id.
292. See supra notes 107-27, 206-16 and
accompanying text.
293.  See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
294.  See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
295.  See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
296.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
297.  See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
298.  See supra notes 194-202 and accompany-
ing text.
299.  See supra notes 204-21 and accompanying
text.
300.  Id.
301.  See supra notes 222-59 and accompanying
text.
302.  See supra note 291-93 and accompanying
text.
303.  See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
304.  See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
when such mismanagement threatens our
priceless natural resources.  When
Congress enacted the National Park
Service Organic Act, it gave all Americans
an interest in our national parks.  The
decisions which derogate a national park’s
integrity and purpose also diminish our
interests in national park protection.
Therefore, snowmobiling must be elimi-
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